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Abstract 
This article takes a close look at the discussion of singularity in Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
The Inoperative Community and Being Singular Plural as an attempt to negate the 
subject/object dichotomy and create a new context for a re-evaluation of 
resistance. With its aim of refuting individualistic subjectivity, the philosophy of 
singularity puts forward that the humanist point of view unnecessarily polarizes 
individuality and community. By placing a challenging scenario of antihumanism 
against the humanist sense of responsibility, the philosophy of singularity 
questions whether it is possible to do philosophy without saying ‘I’. This 
antihumanist stance, which replaces the ‘I’/‘other’ differentiation with Nancy’s 
‘the other of another,’ chooses to strengthen the link between ontology and 
resistance in the notion of coexistence, beyond traditional hypotheses on 
immanence or transcendence. In order to discover the manifestation of 
coexistence within the frame of an antihumanist philosophy of singularity, this 
article begins with digging deep under the notion of individualistic subjectivity to 
show that it embodies a hollow and plastic category. Following this, Nancy’s 
stress on the term ‘ecstasy’ will be grounded upon the Freudian theory of drives 
and the concept of coexistence will be situated in a dark realm that the humanist 
worldview would expect in the least. And finally, against the background of this 
theoretical structure, values such as modesty and responsibility will be highlighted 
as an attempt to uncover an alternative moral consciousness that weaves itself out 
of an indefinite possibility lurking under the skin of the individual/community 
enigma.  
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‘Man’ is the ideology of dehumanization. 
(The Jargon of Authenticity, 59) 
 
The issue or notion of singularity has been overlooked by a majority of 
philosophical spheres; however, this ignorance toward singularity can roughly be 
attributed to the very strong possibility that it might already be serving as quite a 
fundamental aspect of the problem of subject/object dichotomy. G. W. F. Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit is probably the best example of the initial statement of this 
article in that it keeps hinting at singularity without really mentioning it by its full name. 
Following in his steps, Martin Heidegger might also be said to have built his own 
understanding of singularity thanks to the heavily topographical introduction of his 
famous Dasein. This already-thereness of singularity, especially when it comes to the 
concept of individualism and the harmonious or dissonant relationship it may have with 
human community, has also proven to be a significant concern for modern thinkers. 
Gilles Deleuze, for example, discussed singularities in three of his major works; A 
Thousand Plateaus (with Félix Guattari), The Logic of Sense, Difference and Repetition 
alongside with Alain Badiou, who made the concept of singularity central to his 
reinterpretation of ‘the event’ in his Thinking the Event and “Eight Theses on the 
Universal”. This article, however, is based on a rereading of Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
Inoperative Community and Being Singular Plural. The peculiar experience of reading 
these books acts not as a trip taken to the realm of classical philosophy, where we 
uncover what was previously hidden, but as perusing a favourite novel for the second or 
third time to give one more recognition to an idea or ideal that all readers are already 
well familiar with. Nancy’s excursions through the various tenets of singularity have an 
aspect that tries to avoid the sphere of knowledge as much as it can and for this reason, 
his work comes across as literature transfigured philosophically. His is an attempt to do 
philosophy by making use of the non-communicative aspect of the act of writing 
literature; an attempt at silence even. Much as it is quite a challenging task to speculate 
on a philosophy such as Nancy’s, which instantly forces its author to follow a circular 
movement instead of coming at a coherent, well-designed argument, this article aims to 
take a critical look at three central problematic areas that Nancy discusses under the 
general title of singularity. Through additional readings of Maurice Blanchot’s The 
Unavowable Community, Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community and another 
short text by Nancy, “Freud—so to Speak”, the issue of subjectivity will be posed as a 
value that leads to deformed models of society; the notion of ecstasy or ek-stasis will be 
reviewed according to its close relationship with the Freudian Trieb; and finally, 
Nancy’s concept of sharing will be portrayed as a new way of dealing with ontology. 
With this structure in mind, this article distances itself from Deleuze’s and Badiou’s 
readings of singularity. In Deleuze’s above-mentioned works, we can only seldom 
remark a parallel drawn between singularities and resistance while this paper engages 
itself primarily with an ethical praxis that takes resistance as its driving force. Badiou’s 
analysis, on the other hand, despite being very similar to that of Nancy’s on many 
instances, is still difficult to integrate into the context of antihumanism from which this 
article derives its radical texture. The overall impact of this article hopes to achieve the 
negation of the humanitarian impression that Nancy’s work on singularity seems to 
convey at first sight, as a contribution to the discipline of negative anthropology. The 
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givenness of singularity, as discussed by Nancy, is more to do with what is nonhuman 
in human than with an authoritarian rereading of the human condition which supposedly 
acts as an invisible link that ties us all together. Instead of providing its reader with 
another mythology of human community, Nancy’s singularity underlines the death of 
the human ego and calls for a new understanding of sharing that resists conventional 
ethics. 
 
CRITICIZING INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES: BEING 
‘OTHER’ 
The starting point of a great number of philosophical adventures is the question 
of individuality. As a very human term, individuality is sometimes appropriated for 
other animate beings, most often animals, as an attempt to give them a special, 
autonomous value beyond their lives merely as species. To be an individual, in the 
traditional sense, is to be able to extract oneself from the group; to be able to stand out 
as a unique character and in its most tragic cases, to transform oneself into the figure of 
a powerful leader or a hero. Before the age of leaders and heroes, man was faced with a 
reality called nature and somehow, probably thanks to his abilities that differentiate him 
from the rest of the living world, managed to tackle numerous hardships brought 
forward by the pure forces of nature. During the course of history, human’s status 
against nature only strengthened, as a reaction to which certain movements such as 
Romanticism endeavoured to erase this status and create a harmony between the 
humanitarian and the natural.1 Beyond, yet still closely related to man’s struggle with 
nature, is the question of community, which has preserved its enigmatic character since 
the humankind learned how to write critiques of itself. The treatment of individuality as 
a given, though most modern thinkers believe it is actually a value falsely crafted by 
different processes of immanence, has necessarily required from humanity to consider 
the question of community; the state of being together under these or those national, 
cultural and historical sets of values. However, the kind of community in which all 
members are treated as equals—in mainly socio-economic terms—has not yet been 
exemplified on a mass scale. Putting all varieties of affirmative values such as 
nationality and culture out of the picture, Blanchot and Nancy were especially 
concerned with the failure of the socialist project in The Unavowable Community and 
The Inoperative Community. Both Blanchot and Nancy attempted to understand the 
factors which led to the fall of the socialist ideal through the limits and possibility of 
community. At the heart of these philosophical attempts is, of course, the issue of 
subjectivity. 
1  For both classical and radical examples of this, see: 
 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Athenäum Fragments’ in Philosophical Fragments (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991). 
 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, L’absolu littéraire (Paris: Seuil, 1967). 
 Maurice Blanchot, L’espace littéraire (Paris: Gallimard, 1980). 
 Georg Lukács, ‘On the Romantic Philosophy of Life’ in Soul and Form (London: Merlin 
Press, 1974). 
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 The notion of subjectivity is in close affinity with the human condition because 
the human being, as a unique force in itself, has felt the need to prove itself against the 
external object, which can be signified by nature, social structures, governments, 
institutions, etc. Even though subjectivity has served as a useful tool to fight against 
state-based oppression, various sociological and cultural ideologies, so, roughly 
anything that we might call a “system”, it has also been the closest ally of 
communitarian and even fascistic trends. The intimate relationship between subjectivity 
and oppressive models of society has come to be criticized and deconstructed by a 
majority of continental philosophers, who questioned, maybe for the first time, the 
human condition. For the critics who began questioning the validity of the humanist 
argument following World War II, negative anthropology resists the “theological 
shadows lurk[ing] in the history of modern thought, in concepts and ontological 
arrangements that ground notions of man, and even in political movements that flaunted 
their secular credentials” (Geroulanos 2010: 6). The theological background of the 
humanist argument, dating back to the teachings of the Bible, has come to act as a 
transparent layer over all areas of life and placed its mark on all historical eras 
beginning from the European Enlightenment. The exertion of the word ‘human’ in 
positive sciences and studies of history alike transformed itself into an intolerance 
toward whatever is not human; an impulse to categorize among different forms of 
human; a giant disrespect for nature and in consequence, two atrocities that changed the 
course of history: the world wars. The impact that these wars made to most European 
philosophers created a flux of disbelief in the notion of humanity, which found its 
strongest representation in what we call negative anthropology today.2 In Stefanos 
Geroulanos’s words, “what modernity has done, accordingly, is dehumanize our 
existence in and interpretation of the world, by defining it through a scientific 
radicalism that represses and indeed obliterates its own religious, tragic, metaphysical, 
radically heterogeneous dimensions and instead becomes itself a metaphysics” (2010: 
86-7). Negative anthropology, or antihumanism, acts against the metaphysics of 
humanism and aims to look at all areas of life from something that is not human. The 
very first sacrifice made to this end is, of course, the reverence for the notion of 
individualistic subjectivity. 
Having merged the failure of the socialist project and the dead end of humanist 
individuality, Blanchot and Nancy tend toward the idea that the insistence on a 
subjective viewpoint is at the core of both problems. Following the trails of Georges 
Bataille, Blanchot states that the individual’s need for community is based on the 
2  For examples of post-war antihumanism, see: 
 Thierry Maulnier, La Crise est dans l’homme (Paris: Redier [La Revue Française], 1932). 
 Alexis Carrel, Man the Unknown (London/New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935). 
 André Malraux, The Temptation of the West, trans. R. Hollander (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992). 
 André Malraux, Man’s Fate [La Condition humaine], trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: 
Vintage, 1990). 
 Emmanuel Levinas, “De l’évasion,” Recherches philosophiques V (1935–36): 373–92. 
 Jean Hyppolite, “Humanisme et hégélianisme,” in Umanesimoe scienza politica, ed. Enrico 
Castelli (Milan: C. Marzorati, 1951). 
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). 
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principle of insufficiency; or in his own terms, the excess of a lack. This lack exists in 
every single human, which calls itself an individual, and the urgency to build a 
community comes exactly from the excess of this lack. In this way, communities are 
formed in an illusion that if these separate human entities live together, the excess of 
their lack can be reconciled with affirmative values, such as culture, history and 
language. Thus the humankind has formed its various ideologies, cultures and national 
ideals, each revolving around a metaphysics of humanity and each as a means of 
proving that the lack does not exist; that instead, man exists as an autonomous 
individual in the system that he built together with the other members of his community. 
Especially the recent thinkers of negative anthropology, who are not afraid of using the 
term antihumanism literally, take the lead from their structuralist and post-structuralist 
ancestors and suggest a viewpoint that openly resists the theology of humanism so that 
we can imagine a community not based on left-wing ideologies or the claim of ‘equality 
for all,’ but on the notions of the nonsubjective and the nonhuman in human.3 
The speculation above almost instantly brings to mind the question of the other. 
This question emerges exactly out of the problematic of subjectivity because simply, if 
this is an I, you have to be an other: whatever makes me a subject directly makes you an 
object within the context of epistemology. What Nancy achieves with his work on 
singularity is a negation of both these statuses of the I and the other. By claiming that 
“identity […] is always the other of another identity” (2000: 149), Nancy destroys every 
single position that might be taken as a unique individual. In Nancy’s philosophy, there 
is nothing magical about the human condition and no one has privilege over another 
because every sentient being has its own singular position. The dialectic of otherness, 
then, turns into an immensely egalitarian way of looking at one another, which 
advocates the idea that I am (is) an other and the other is (am) I. This formula, if we 
may call it so, also underlines the idea that there is no “higher Ego or We” (1991: 15) in 
the community Nancy and Blanchot write about. The human condition, which requires 
subjectivity as a means of fighting against the external agents and utilizes immanence to 
create those subjectivities, has also given rise to various models of society that do 
nothing but hamper freedom. These different models of society are in fact embodied by 
the ultimate I; all the separate egos merged in one, be it a nation, God or a powerful 
leader and the obliteration of free thought/action is caused by this ultimate I. The 
philosophy of singularity goes hand in hand with negative anthropology because it 
refuses the politics of subjectivity altogether and deprives the ego of the autonomy it 
thinks it has by defining every I as an other. The otherness of each person to himself 
also takes the issue of recognition out of the picture and replaces it with contestation. In 
Blanchot’s and Nancy’s community, there is no room whatsoever for one person 
recognizing himself in the other, because the other is only an instance and space of lack 
like oneself and where there can be no recognition, there can only be contestation.  
3  For recent examples of antihumanism, see: 
 Thomas Ligotti, The Conspiracy Against the Human Race (New York: Hippocampus, 2010). 
 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (London: Penguin, 
2008). 
 John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals (London: Granta, 2003). 
 Tony Davies, Humanism (London: Routledge, 1997). 
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Contestation should not be read as conflict caused by differences between two 
points of view; the contestation that Blanchot and Nancy stress does not refer to an 
environment of competition. For them, every I contests an other as a break or as an 
interruption of the very process of subjectivity. Every other that the I comes across does 
not interrupt the process of subjectivity because it is different than the I but because it is 
exactly the same as the I. Every other, in a way, reminds the I of the fact that 
immanence works similarly for these two supposedly different standpoints and states 
that both the positions are singular thanks to the plurality of the singulars. In Hegel’s 
philosophical system, to recount a well-known example, every birth is “an event” 
(Nancy 2000: 172) because it disturbs the overall process of life of all the existent 
subjectivities. But the happening of this event is exactly what deprives subjectivity of its 
separate position from the system, for it is not formed or produced; it happens, just like 
every other happens to the I. This happening is employed as a very useful tool in both 
Blanchot’s and Nancy’s discussions of community because it stands at the very opposite 
to the notion of work or production. In the philosophy of singularity, nothing is 
produced; there are only singulars happening to each other and events happening to 
certain multiplicities of these singulars. Even though Hegel serves as a great influence 
for Nancy’s thought, the concept of happening or the event removes any textbook 
understanding of both immanence and transcendence from the general frame of 
singularity.  
Immanence refers to a process, a personal or even isolated process which makes 
one different than the other but which, in the final picture, creates human masses based 
on the subjectivity that it advocates and this situation must rightfully present the human 
condition as the oldest paradox on earth. Similarly, transcendence is another form of 
work or production, which aims not at creating something anew but reaching a point 
that is already perfectly complete. This striving toward completion stands at the 
opposite end from the discussion of singularity and this new way of looking at 
community, which comes along with it. As every act of production stems from some 
kind of subjectivity, for I have to be autonomous in order to create something, and as 
every act of production in the realm of community has failed, there is the urgent need to 
think community anew and without the human in the picture, by removing everything 
that is human from the picture. Usually, “community [...] is seen as something full—a 
substance, a promise, a value—that does not let itself be emptied out by the vortex of 
nothingness” (Esposito 2009: 25), so communities are believed to remain intact even 
though individuals on their own are expected to break down more easily. However, 
Nancy’s singular angle on the issue is contrary to what is generally assumed because his 
community designates a unity of otherness. Accordingly, Roberto Esposito reads Nancy 
quite aptly with his remark that “if community is always the community of others and 
never of oneself, this means that its presence is structurally inhabited by an absence—of 
subjectivity, identity, and property. It means that it is not a ‘thing’—or, it is a thing 
defined precisely by its ‘not’” (2009: 27). In this way, negative anthropology gives way 
to the negation of community as we have come to know it so far. From this negative 
view, community does not point toward something complete in itself; something that is 
made up of the affirmative coming together of individuals, so community does not 
signify something that transcends the subjectivity of man alone in its form of ultimate 
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subjectivity. Thanks to this dialectic of individual/community, transcendence itself is 
revealed to be only another project of human intention, instead of pointing us toward 
something divine.   
 
DEATH AND EK-STASIS 
Against the humanity that is hidden under the skin of transcendence and all 
portrayals of affirmative subjectivity, Nancy seconds Bataille in making a single 
exception for death while criticizing notions of transcendence and in claiming that 
sovereignty is nothing. It must first of all be remembered that “Hegel’s, Nietzsche’s, 
Heidegger’s” systems of thought all “attempt(s) at making death possible” (Critchley 
1997: 68), so death is already a unique agent in the history of philosophy but all the 
same, Bataille is still the core name in Nancy’s interpretation of death. The remark, 
“blindfolded, we refuse to see that only death guarantees the fresh upsurging without 
which life would be blind” (Bataille 2001: 59) summarizes the importance of death for 
Nancy’s reading of singularity better than any other philosopher because it sees death 
not as a source of negativity, downright nothingness or a justification for sacrificing 
one’s life for it. Instead, this remark recognizes the possibility of imagining alternatives 
for individuality, community and transcendence in death. For Nancy, death is the only 
moment of transcendence in the philosophy of singularity and there is sovereignty only 
in “the sovereign exposure to an excess (to a transcendence) that does not present itself 
and does not let itself be appropriated (or simulated), that does not even give itself—but 
rather to which being is abandoned” (1991: 18). However, the moment of death is not 
the religious death at all, which, by making death merely a threshold that leads to ‘the 
other side’, actually deprives death of all its importance for the discussion of singularity. 
Death is sovereign not in that it is a passing over to another kind of space, but in that it 
marks the sole event that cannot in any way be internalized by the I or shared with 
others. This is the sovereignty of death and death is the only sovereignty known and 
because sovereignty is death, sovereignty is, at the same time, nothing. Sovereignty is 
the ultimate or the only nothing that the I, every single I, is exposed to unconditionally. 
Death is what makes us all singulars, as parts of an overall singularity, because it is the 
only common that cannot be shared.  
In light of the above speculation, Agamben’s statement, “humans are separated 
by what unites them” (2007: 89) not only refers to language, but also to the reality of 
death, at the moment of which the I and the other are ontologically united but as 
singulars, separated. Against immanence and wrapped up in its transcendence as the 
finitude of each singular, death is imminent. My death is the only thing that belongs to 
me, but that which is also not mine because like all other singulars, I am (is) nothing but 
a lack. Death is the always-possible otherness, ready to happen any minute of any day. 
It is my vulnerability, my infinitely and passionately open vulnerability, to the 
final/finite negation (of my own personal capital). It is also the indefinite connection that 
ties me to the other and helps me, through thinking death (before it finally comes about) 
understand in an infinite moment that the other has actually never existed. Death is the 
absence of a life that has already never been present and when it is already impossible to 
say my or mine, except with the intention of underlining their complete futility, the age-
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old issue of subjectivity goes down the drain along with the millions of different 
systems that humanity has so far built. There is nothing to produce, according to the 
first chapter of The Inoperative Community, and the only condition that persists within 
the context of plural singulars is that of negative anthropology because both the 
individual and community have to be not reconstructed but rethought first.  
It goes without saying at this point that Nancy’s original motivation to focus on 
death and emphasize its importance for the introduction of an ethics of singularity was 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. According to Simon Critchley, Nancy’s fundamental 
sentiment when he started to work on singularity was that “Being and Time must be 
rewritten without the autarkic telos and tragic-heroic pathos of the thematic of 
authenticity” (1999: 54). However, this task proves more than problematic merely given 
the fact that thinking death and adjusting the life of Being according to it comprise the 
only path that can lead to authenticity according to Heidegger’s major work dating back 
to 1927. So it would not be irrational at all to claim that it is practically impossible to 
separate the discussion of death from that of authenticity within a predominantly 
Heideggerian context. All the same, a link can still be established between Nancy’s 
critique of our textbook understanding of community and Heidegger’s mistrust in the 
‘public’. According to Heidegger, being aware of the reality of death as an end not only 
reshapes the singular’s approach toward its Being as ‘care’ but it also separates the 
singular from the ‘publicness’ of ‘the they’, which clumsily evades the significance of 
this sovereign event. It is argued in Being and Time that “publicness proximally controls 
every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right [...] 
because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never 
gets to the ‘heart of the matter’ (‘auf die Sachen’)” (1962: 165). What can accomplish 
this Hegelian ideal is of course Dasein, which, in the accompaniment of death, is “in its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (1962: 294).    
What fascinates Nancy in Heidegger’s thought is, in fact, the assertion that death 
is recognizable to the singular only thanks to another singular’s death. “The ‘they’ does 
not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death” (1962: 298), according to 
Heidegger and against the endeavor of ‘the they’ to hide away all the details 
surrounding someone’s demise, Heidegger’s revolutionizing idea inspires Nancy to 
imagine new coexistences. In this way, the socially-binding aspects of the reality of 
death leave their place to freedom, a relentlessly creative freedom that connects the 
being of the singular to its utmost possibility for authenticity. Nonetheless, this 
“freedom towards death”, in Heideggerian terminology, is not only “a freedom which 
has been released from the Illusions of the ‘they’” but which is also “factical, certain of 
itself, and anxious” (1962: 311). On this note, it is indeed worth drawing a conclusion 
from the above discussion in this article that the singularity which Nancy suggests is far 
from being factical, self-conscious and anxious. Being and Time insists that “anxiety 
individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ‘solus ipse’” (1962: 233), which so far 
seems irrelevant to Nancy’s reading of singularity, whose essential modus operandi is to 
deconstruct individualities. Moreover, by means of this deconstruction, Nancy imagines 
singulars on a plane where each one does not look anxiously upon its own end through 
the end of another; but where each singular catches (or becomes caught up in) events of 
coexistence with other singulars to resist the dominant discourse of community. 
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Heidegger’s discussion of death, on the other hand, puts less stress on coexisting with 
others within the world, than the state of ‘das Nicht-zuhause-sein’, which causes the 
discussion to keep coming back to the individualization of Dasein through uncanniness 
and the anxiety caused by it.  
Against the background of Heidegger’s anxiety, what is utilized in Bataille’s, 
Nancy’s and Blanchot’s texts, as an attempt to locate the possibility of community, is 
ecstasy. Ecstasy is generally associated with being overwhelmingly happy and it also 
carries the connotation of having exceeded one’s own limits. The violation of these 
limits is even better signified with the term ek-stasis, which stands for the situation of 
having left behind whatever state the agent in question was previously in. Moreover, the 
term can be said to point at a state of being state-less. Nancy supports the idea that 
subjectivity prevents the happening of a community to a group of singulars and he 
employs ek-stasis to use it as an antidote for subjectivity. However, for the reason that 
both in Nancy’s and Blanchot’s discussions of community the element of work or 
production is completely out of the picture, ek-stasis, similarly, cannot be used as a 
strategy. Blanchot goes so far as to claiming that “nobody can know what it [ecstasy/ek-
stasis] is about” (1988: 19) and refuses to do an in-depth reading of a very significant 
instance of community, the May 68’ events, through the lens of ek-stasis. Just like a 
great number of other issues that remain untouched or merely implied in Blanchot’s 
philosophical works, how ek-stasis might be related to the happening of community 
rests in silence. Agamben, on the other hand, forms a strong relation between the 
antihumanist view and ek-stasis with his remark, “the threshold is not […] another thing 
with respect to the limit; it is, so to speak, the experience of the limit itself, the 
experience of being-within an outside. This ek-stasis is the gift that singularity gathers 
from the empty hands of humanity” (2007: 75). While “the empty hands of humanity” 
designate the fact that the project of forming an egalitarian community has repetitively 
failed—and dominantly due to humanity’s ancient obsession with subjectivity—ek-
stasis appears to be a blessing that might introduce a new meaning to coexistence. 
However, the problem with this ‘gift’ is that it cannot be located, found or used with the 
intention of anything external; the special value and meaning of this ‘gift’ lie beneath 
the very fact that it is given, that it merely happens to us.   
 
CLINAMEN AND THE THEORY OF DRIVES 
Against the background of Blanchot’s and Agamben’s interpretations of ek-
stasis, the most revealing explanation of the term has been made by Nancy. Leaving the 
overall significance of ek-stasis in Nancy’s philosophy for the final part of this 
discussion, the relationship between the term clinamen and ek-stasis should first be 
pointed out because clinamen is the very element that makes ek-stasis possible. 
Clinamen functions as an extension of the singular, which does not necessarily include 
anything related to the singular’s social or cultural condition as a being. If we assume 
that there is a possible threshold between any two singulars, like Agamben, we should 
say that ek-stasis takes place exactly on this plane and through the clinamen attached to 
the singulars. When the two clinamens, which are the more of both these singulars, 
touch and cling onto each other, ek-stasis takes place. Thus, we can see that, for Nancy, 
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and later, for Agamben, ek-stasis is not simply moving beyond one’s limits but it is 
actually the touching of two clinamens, those two neutral extensions that each singular 
carries along with itself. Nancy’s reading of the clinamen also explains his very intimate 
affinity with the Freudian id and superego. Both acting as shared spheres of humanity, 
yet both completely removed from the autonomy of the ego, Nancy’s antihumanist 
tendency finds its most fitting example in his indebtedness to Sigmund Freud.  
One significant thing that should be noted, though, is the difference between the 
shared spheres of the id and the superego and C. G. Jung’s collective unconscious. This 
gap between Freud’s and Jung’s thinking stems from the fact that the Freudian terms do 
not act as parts of a humanitarian mythology. The two thinkers’ immense difference 
from each other comes from the fact that Freud was always removed from a positive, 
constructive idea of humanism while Jung wanted to believe in the existence of a shared 
memory for a very specific, supposedly superior species such as the human being. So, 
the collective unconscious serves as a very static index of the history of humanity while 
Freud’s terminology already takes the fragmentation of humanity for granted and 
attempts to locate the motions as a part of which the agent expresses or realizes himself. 
This is why the id and the superego remained to be two incomplete terms in Freud’s 
studies, which were defined in different ways in his different texts. Nancy employs this 
ambiguity in making sense of ek-stasis and clinamen and writes that the id and the 
superego are the “being-with”; “the co-constitution of the “ego” (2000: 44-45). Thus, 
Nancy follows Freud’s steps in making the movement against humanism, which turned 
into “a metaphysics that obliterates man under the pretext of promoting him” (2010: 86-
7), and it should be underlined once again that Nancy’s attempt to bring together 
negative anthropology and singularity does not promote hopelessness or despair; on the 
very contrary, it stands for a possibility of rethinking the notion of togetherness.  
Nancy tries to explicate, in “Freud—so to Speak”, the significant position Trieb 
holds for his ontological rereading of community. Translated into English as drive, 
Trieb holds the central point in Nancy’s text due to the fact that it is more than 
“instinct” yet less than “intention” (2008: 146). Sympathizing with Freud’s lifelong 
endeavour to explore the human condition and his inability to find the right context in 
which to discuss it, Nancy’s text implies that Freud’s most important contribution is the 
stress he placed on the theory of drives. The term, in Nancy’s interpretation of Freud’s 
studies on the subconscious, designates the addition to a singular, which acts as an 
“elsewhere” where the singular “rise[s] and become[s] what [it] can be” (2008: 146-
147). This transformation cannot be exemplified by the after-life of religious thought or 
the immanence of “inverted theologies” such as atheism (2008: 147). To the very 
contrary, for Nancy, “this ‘elsewhere’ is within us,” it is “being” (ibid.); it is Trieb in 
constant motion until the moment of definitive motionlessness, death. So, Nancy’s 
clinamen, which makes ek-stasis possible, comes from the Freudian Trieb: the drive(s) 
that sets the singular in motion against the imminence of death. This is why Nancy’s 
references to the id and the superego do not simply underlie the collective unconscious, 
which is motionless and which in fact acts as an agent of subjectivity in the end, but 
they, on the very contrary, try to locate what is beyond the basic conception of the 
human being as an attempt to re-think community. Since the ideal of community has so 
far not been realized due to its subjective undercurrents, Nancy’s restructuring of the id 
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and the superego implies that community is possible only given that the human’s ego is 
broken through.  
It must then be no wonder that death and love are pointed out by Nancy and 
Blanchot as the two phenomena that make community possible. Eros and Thanatos in 
Freudian terminology, these two phenomena act as two unique elements in the 
philosophy of singularity, which surpass the human condition. Generally interpreted in 
Freud’s studies as two opposing forces (even though we cannot definitely say that Freud 
never indicated the generic unity of the two terms), Eros and Thanatos are not only 
terms or basic drives but also two fundamental spheres that are associated with the 
human, yet removed from it by definition. Eros and Thanatos are there to explain the 
motives behind various human actions; however, they are never completely human and 
they always indicate the interaction between at least two human beings. The sharing of 
love and death are the two sharings that are basically impossible but they also serve as 
the unified drive behind the course of life. With the advent of immanence and the rise of 
the ego—causing the emergence of the Ego—the human condition was forced on 
humans by humans themselves, forming a paradox. Nonetheless, a re-visit to Freud’s 
Eros and Thanatos teaches us that “the theory of drives is our mythology” (2008: 149) 
and this forgotten mythology comes back in the forms of love and death as two 
elements that make community possible. Having another look at love and death makes it 
clear why community is never created or formed; the singulars are only driven toward 
community by the forces of love and death. And accordingly, follows the statement that 
community cannot be produced; it is always already there and it is always already 
impossible under humanist terms.   
It should then be said that the plane on which ek-static singulars meet must be 
beyond the personal capital, beyond subjectivities and even beyond the socialist ideal: it 
must be and can already only be beyond human. According to Nancy’s reading, Trieb is 
a term utilized by Freud to talk about an effort or a forced meaning, which happened 
before and which will also happen after signification (ibid.). If we go back to Blanchot’s 
comments on the May 68’ events based on the above reading, it is not a surprise that he 
described the events as uncanny in their innocence (1988: 30) because their innocence 
can be placed right between instinct and intention; before and after the humanness of 
signification; in the realm of Trieb; and unconditionally beyond human. “‘What is 
man?’,” asks Geroulanos and answers his own question by saying that “we can only 
know what he is not” (2010: 18). Nancy’s reading of community is also based on this 
‘not’; instead of coming up with a formula for an egalitarian, ideal togetherness, he 
reveals a form of community whose essence does not have any space for any grounding 
material. Geroulanos continues his inquiry on the nature of man accordingly, by stating 
that “whatever its specific rights and wrongs, every humanism is fundamentally bound 
to the community’s self-regulation; it is thus arbitrary, auto-productive, and all but 
tautological” (2010: 21). Removing ourselves from this tautology, these forced, plastic 
versions of togetherness might only be possible through a thinking that negates 
anthropology. This is why Nancy openly states that we must go beyond all possible 
horizons and it is also why the two principal components of Trieb in general, Eros and 
Thanatos, act as antihuman agents making community possible; they are the more of 
every horizon set by humanity against humanity.     
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TOWARD A NEW ETHICS: THE SHARING OF THE WORLD 
In The Inoperative Community, Nancy asserts that, “community or the being-
ecstatic of Being itself” (1991: 6) is the question that we are ultimately faced with; 
however, he answers his own question by pointing out that community is the being-
ecstatic of Being itself and using it as the fundamental premise of his much later work, 
Being Singular Plural. What this premise means is that there can be no community 
unless Being itself has moved beyond itself; gone right upon its own threshold. On a 
deeper level, it means that Being itself loses its status as a given and all the singulars 
come together within a sphere of giving when community happens to us. This giving 
underlies a very important term in Nancy’s philosophy of singularity: responsibility. 
While the process of immanence and the achievement of transcendence tend to regard 
the individual, society, the absolute, etc. as a set of givens, singularity leaves no room 
for any givens whatsoever. With no givens and nothing to produce, singularity rises out 
of the with, which is not a fact, but something that is in a constant motion of appearing 
and disappearing between (at least) two singulars until the moment of death. Nancy’s 
discussion of the human excess, as a reply to Blanchot’s excess of a lack, means nothing 
other than the more of every singular, the clinamen, Trieb. Nancy’s usage of the phrase, 
human excess, does not come from the idea that the excess is made up of what is 
human, but from the intimation that there is something that exceeds every human—
every singular—and creates an abundance of the excess. This excess marks Nancy’s 
unique way of rereading ontology. In his own words, “Being, then, is finite, in the sense 
that there is no ‘infinite speed,’ but its finitude has no measure; it is its own total 
measure of Being. In this sense, it is infinite, but an infinitude that consists in being its 
own excessive measure. The result is not Being as a substance, but Being as 
responsibility” (2000: 182-183). Being is finite because there exists the reality of death 
but death as finitude has no measure whatsoever because it is the common among 
humans, which cannot be shared, and that is why there is an excess of death, making 
finitude infinite. So all the singulars have a responsibility toward another singular under 
the imminence of death, which both marks their finitude and due to its excess, makes 
the plurality of those singulars, Being, infinite.   
The above finitude/infinity dialectic brings out the question of the divine in 
Nancy’s philosophy of singularity. He surely intends to set a new meaning for the 
divine by utilizing such a discourse and this discourse is seconded by Agamben as we 
can see that both writers set the matter of ethos or ethics as a cue to follow up on. Nancy 
writes that terms such as “community, death, love, freedom, singularity” are “names for 
the ‘divine’” not because they “substitute for it” or because they “sublate it” but because 
they do not include any references to “anthropomorphism” or “anthropocentricism” 
(1991: 11). So, Nancy’s divine is the complete opposite of the human-centred 
worldview of dominant religious ideologies and also the notions of subjectivity brought 
forward by atheism. Nancy’s divine is a direct reference to the issue of community 
because it is only through the with that we can talk about ontology and give meaning to 
existence. In this schema, the world is transformed from being the representation of 
humanity, to being “the exposure” of it (2000: 18) and “there is no presence that is not 
(in its being, not as an attribute) exposed to sharing” (1992: 385). All notions of 
 
An Antihumanist Reinterpretation of the Philosophy of Singularity 
    
 
257 2016/27 
production and subjectivity also disappear into thin air and the vulnerability of humanity 
is fully revealed in Nancy’s discourse on singularity.  
Agamben supports a similar view by stating that “if humans were or had to be 
this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience would be possible” 
(2007: 50). So the ethos of togetherness can only be practised based on a lack; a “not”; 
an abundance of what negates humanity within humanity. What we find in this new 
ethical experience, according to Agamben and Nancy, is the recognition of the with; the 
recognition that Being is and has always been Being-with. As the position of a singular 
designates being equally alike and equally different to all other singulars, forming one 
plural singularity, we are no longer discussing the issue of how to bring a group of 
singulars together; we are now talking about the always-possible ek-stasis that is in 
constant motion of appearing and disappearing right in-between these singulars. Termed 
as the whatever in Agamben’s Coming Community, the notion of the singular manifests 
a brand new ontology, which focuses on a fundamental indifference posited against all 
kinds of social or cultural attributes the singulars or the whatevers come to have. Within 
this context, the only angle we can have is that of relationality; Being as, and only as, 
the relation between and amongst singulars. Nancy thinks that this relation, this with, 
“does not go anywhere; it does not constitute a process, but it is the closeness, the 
brushing up against or the coming across, the almost there of distanced proximity” 
(2000: 98). So, there is no discourse of unity but an always-possible, imminent closing-
up and distancing-from of the singulars, which happens to the singulars.  
It is beyond any doubt that the idea of sharing the world is deeply related to the 
origins of Dasein which, Heidegger feels the need to say is the world, “if one should 
want to identify the world in general with entities within-the-world” (1962: 154). In the 
early chapters of Being and Time, the ‘I’ is not only designated as “a certain privileged 
point—that of an I-Thing”, but more as a “Being-in in terms of the ‘yonder’ of the 
world that is ready-to-hand—the ‘yonder’ which is the dwelling-place of Dasein as 
concern” (1962: 155). It is possible so far to understand why Nancy constructed his 
philosophy of singularity on Heideggerian ontology; however, all the radical aspects of 
this new ontological-ethical approach are exposed to significant damage when the 
statement that “if Dasein is there no longer, then the world too is something that has-
been-there” (1962: 445) is taken into consideration. Heidegger’s Dasein is construed in 
such a way that it belongs only within the context of human mind. This sentiment is 
taken on in its entirety in his much later “Letter on Humanism” where he openly asserts 
that “only the human being is admitted to the destiny of ek-sistence” (1998: 247). Here, 
Dasein, which is individualized by anxiety, is completely separated from other entities 
which are categorized under the same name along with ‘world-historical’ and ‘world-
conscience’. So, in Heideggerian singularity—if we can call it that at all—the Being-
with of Dasein is a lot higher in importance than other, non-human singulars, which all 
the same are parts of this Being-with. On the very contrary to both Nancy’s rereading of 
singularity and the antihumanist ethics which this rereading relies on, Heidegger’s 
Dasein remains solitary on the exalted plane of “authenticity and totality” (1962: 276) 
upon acquiring “the essential poverty of the shepherd” (1998: 260). As Geroulanos also 
writes, “Heidegger’s is a humanism without man, a humanism that negates man to get to 
him—and in this sense, at once a protohumanism and a hyperhumanism” (2010: 249). 
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In antihumanist singularity, however, there is not much room for a shepherd absolutized 
within itself and thus separated from his flock; Nancy’s singularity asserts the kind of 
sharing which consists both of the human and of the non-human.     
Giving no more room to producing or forming something, the philosophy of 
singularity negates both systematization and subjectivity and opens up a new 
dimension: a new ethical realm that is based on the principle of responsibility toward 
the other. So, Levinas’s critique of the “bourgeois drive toward self-sufficiency, which 
involves the construction of an I that forgets and oppresses all that is ‘not-I’” (2010: 
176-177) is fulfilled by the ethical aspect of the philosophy of singularity. Only in this 
way humanity is transformed into a merely biological name or a category which is no 
longer signified but exposed through the with between any two singulars. But either 
Levinas’s or Nancy’s/Agamben’s “opposition does not mean that such thinking allies 
itself against the humane and advocates the inhuman, that it promotes the inhumane and 
deprecates the dignity of the human being” (2010: 235). On the very contrary, thinking 
against humanity is utilized by these philosophers as a method of rethinking, 
reimagining better communities not only for humanity but also for all other things that 
share the world with it. Nancy makes it clear that “the sharing of the world is the law of 
the world. […] Cosmos, nomos” (2000: 185) and our responsibility refers exactly to this 
sharing which is “always incomplete […] For a complete sharing implies the 
disappearance of what is shared” (1991: 35).  
With the above remarks, Nancy also gives a strong reply to Blanchot’s imagining 
of a community, in which “the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ do not live in the same time, are never 
together (synchronously), can therefore not be contemporary, but separated (even when 
united) by a ‘not yet’ which goes hand in hand with an ‘already no longer’” (1988: 42). 
It is true that the I and the other are both separated and united during the courses of love 
and death—two essential terms in this discussion of community—however, this is not a 
hopeless, indefinite separation; it is, on the contrary, a separation whose opposite is not 
unity. The image of community that Nancy, and Agamben though indirectly, reveal is as 
open-ended as the question of ethics, so Critchley’s remark that “fundamental ontology 
is ethical and ethics is fundamentally ontological” (1999: 245) is perfectly to the point. 
Nancy’s vision of sharing provides us with “a program of work” (1992: 386), which is 
full of challenges most of which defy our subjective, human viewpoint. What is named 
‘work’ here is also “much less the completed production than this very movement, 
which does not ‘produce’ but opens and continually holds the work open” (2007: 65). In 
a nutshell, the work of sharing revolves around a lack and aims toward the kind of 
humility that clears the space where all beings can co-exist without identifying 
themselves with this or that affirmative value. During this practice of revolving, the I 
and the other are in a relationship of a remote closeness, where the distance is not 
mourned and the proximity is not interpreted as a finalizing, blissful touch. Both states 
being beyond human—and I believe Blanchot’s reading of community is still within 
humanitarian limits—the remoteness and the closeness are driven by Eros and Thanatos. 
Where these two drives meet, community happens and our final concern is to explore 
the ethical experience that makes it possible, for all the singulars, to recognize and 
respect this happening, the coming of this community of resistance, which no longer 
relies on the textbook definition of man.    
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AN OPENING 
Nancy’s philosophy of singularity may not be fully original at surface value due 
to its Hegelian and Heideggerian influences but his boldness in taking the matter of 
singularity up to the level of community-thinking is so far unmatched both in structure 
and style. The highlights of Nancy’s work are the amount of respect placed on the 
concept of relationality, the various angles from which the notion of subjectivity can be 
destroyed and the assertion of the possibility that community may have always been a 
question of non-human drives. These aspects of singularity not only fascinate but also 
puzzle their reader because it sounds too challenging a thought to base all the highlights 
above on post-war antihumanism. However, imagining communities from a nonhuman 
angle renders the notion of togetherness all the more ethically valuable: the erasure of 
the human ego and the emphasis on the theory of drives carry the potential to guide us 
out of the mess we made of living together. Maybe the whole point of Nancy’s 
philosophy of singularity is to awaken a sense of responsibility in its reader (be it a 
philosopher or a mine worker) so that we can all begin communicating on that 
indefinable, silent and humble plane of mere existence. The most important word of this 
plane of existence and the ultimate substitution for the I might be the we. Nancy writes 
in his book on Hegel that “‘we’ is not something—neither object nor self—that the 
absolute would be near, as if the absolute were itself another thing or another self. On 
the contrary: that the absolute be or wants to be near us means that it is our ‘near us,’ 
our just-between-us [entre-nous], the just-between-us of our manifestation, our 
becoming, and our desire” (2002: 78). So the discussion of transcendence above, within 
the context of singularity, is quite different than both Hegel’s absolute knowing and 
Heidegger’s authoritative, heavily-conceptualised Being. Nancy, by not defining the 
absolute as if it were a separate entity and removing the anthropological priority from 
his speculation on togetherness, takes us to the mere existence of the we and the ethical 
responsibility that it suggests. The urgency of the question of ethics points at a new 
vision of the world as exposure of humanity, which is now a hollow biological term, 
and strives toward a new understanding of moral responsibility, which is no longer 
anthropocentric. It is even possible to say that ethics has never been feasible from a 
human point of view; that ethics demands from us to leave behind our statuses as 
separate human subjects and look at the exposure of this world anew from the viewpoint 
of the we, which cannot be planned or produced, only experienced through our mutual 
lack, our human excess. Sozusagen, but we always say something “approximately,” like 
Nancy believes he does with Freud (2008: 149) and this article believes it does with 
Nancy. It is fascinating how humanity has always been obsessed with systematization 
and completion yet all that it has produced is unfortunately incomplete. But this 
incompleteness is not something to get sunk into or mourned; Nancy’s antihumanist 
singularity only celebrates life by underlining the imminence of death. More 
importantly, it shows us that both individual and communal resistance depend on a 
circular course. Thanks to his ultimate argument against argumentation, Nancy portrays 
visions of togetherness with the aptness of a literary genius. 
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Tekillik Felsefesinin Antihümanist  
Bir Yeniden Okuması 
 
Öz 
Bu makale, Jean-Luc Nancy’nin Inoperative Community ve Being Singular Plural 
isimli eserlerinde işlediği tekillik kavramını, mevcut özne/nesne ikilemini 
olumsuzlama ve direniş olgusuna yeni bir bağlam yaratma çabası ile ele alıyor. 
Birey olma düşüncesini ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlayan tekillik felsefesi, hümanist 
bakış açısının bireysellik ile topluluk nosyonlarını gereksiz şekilde zıtlaştırdığını 
savunur. Hümanist sorumluluk bilincinin karşısına iddialı bir antihümanizm 
tablosunu yerleştiren tekillik felsefesi, “ben” ibaresi olmadan felsefe yapmanın 
mümkün olup olmadığını sorgular. Ayrı ayrı “ben” ve “öteki” demenin yerine, 
Nancy’nin tabiriyle “ötekinin ötekisi”ni koyan bu antihümanist konum, ontoloji 
ile direniş arasındaki bağı, geleneksel içkinliğin ve aşkınlığın ötesinde, “bir 
aradalık”ta güçlendirmeyi hedef alır. Bu çalışmada, bir arada var olmanın 
antihümanist tekillik felsefesi bağlamındaki görünümlerini keşfetme amacıyla, 
öncelikle bireysellik kavramının altı oyularak, bunun aslında içi boş ve bütünüyle 
yapay bir kategori oluşturduğuna dikkat çekilecek. Daha sonra Nancy’nin ekstaz 
kavramı Freudyen id ve itkiler teorisinde temellendirilerek bir aradalık, hümanist 
dünya görüşünün hiç beklemeyeceği, karanlık bir alanda konumlandırılacak. Son 
olarak, bu genel teorik çerçeve içinde sorumluluk ve tevazu değerlerinin önemine 
vurgu yapılarak, birey/bir aradalık çıkmazının altında yatan sonsuz olanaklılığa 
göz kırpan alternatif bir ahlak bilinci önermesi yapılacak. 
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